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Abstract
In a transshipment game, supply chain agents cooperate to transship surplus products. This
note studies the effect of size of transshipment coalitions on the optimal production/order quan-
tities. It characterizes these quantities for transshipment games with identical newsvendors and
normally distributed market demands. It also gives a closed form formula for equal allocation
in their cores.
Keywords: Supply Chain Management, Decision analysis, Inventory, Game Theory
1 Introduction
Transshipment is the practice of sharing common resources among supply chain entities who face
uncertain market demands. Although transshipment games have been extensively studied in the
literature (see Paterson et al. (2011) for a recent review), their complexity hinders the derivation
of straightforward analytical results in general. Specifically, the effect of size of transshipping
coalition, i.e. the number of transshipping locations, on the production/order quantities has never
been investigated before in the literature. The characterization of optimal quantities is useful in
both centralized supply chain contexts (e.g. Herer et al. (2006)), and cooperative transshipment
games (Hezarkhani and Kubiak (2010), Anupindi et al. (2001), and Sosˇic´ (2006) among others). In
the latter case, the key result of Slikker et al. (2005) ensures a non-empty core for a transshipment
game. However, the question of how the growth of transshipping coalitions affect the optimal
quantities and expected profit remains open and it will be addressed in this note.
In Section 3 and 4, we characterize the main properties of transshipment amounts and opti-
mal quantities respectively in multi-location/multi-agent transshipment games for identical agents
facing normally distributed demands. The games are introduced in Section 2. There are three
categories of transshipment games: over-mean, under-mean, and mean games. The game category
depends on the optimal quantity, i.e. critical fractile, of a single newsvendor entity. As the game
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size grows these optimal quantities get closer to the distribution mean for the over- and under-
mean problems. However, for either category, we show that there is a threshold value for the
transportation cost t such that the optimal quantity converges to the demand distribution mean
for transportation cost not exceeding the threshold, and to a certain bound different from the mean
for transportation costs above the threshold. A closed form formula for equal allocation in the core
is derived in Section 5.
2 Cooperative Transshipment Games
Consider a set N of n newsvendor agents. Each agent i ∈ N decides its production/order quantity
(simply quantity hereafter), Xi, in anticipation of a random demand Di having continuous and twice
differentiable pdf with mean µi and standard deviation σi. The market selling price, purchasing
cost, and salvage value are denoted by ri, ci, and νi respectively (νi < ci < ri). The newsvendors
have the option to form a transshipment coalition to transship their otherwise surplus products
to other members of the coalition after the realization of demands. In order to physically move
one unit of product from newsvendor i to newsvendor j, both members of the same coalition, the
transportation cost tij is incurred. The Wij is the quantity transshipped from newsvendor i to j. In
order to avoid trivial scenarios, we assume that for all i, j ∈ N , ci < cj + tji, νi < νj + tji, ri < rj + tji,
and tij < rj − νi. By X, D, we denote vectors of quantities and random demands, and by W the
n × n matrix of transshipped quantities respectively, for agents in N .
The cooperative transshipment game is a cooperative game (J˙ ,N) with the characteristic func-
tion J˙ ∶ 2N → R, being a two-stage stochastic program with recourse, which assigns to any coalition
M ⊆ N the value J˙M equal to
J˙M = max
X
JM(X) = max
X
E [∑
i∈M (ri min(Xi,Di) + νiHi − ciXi) +RM(X,D)] (1)
where for given X and D,
RM(X,D) = max
W
∑
i∈M ∑j∈M pijWij (2)
s.t. ∑
j∈MWij ≤Hi,∀i ∈M∑
i∈MWij ≤ Ej ,∀j ∈M
Wij ≥ 0,∀i, j ∈M.
The Hi = max(Xi −Di,0) and Ei = max(Di −Xi,0) are newsvendor i’s surplus, and unsatisfied
demand respectively and pij = rj −νi−tij is the marginal transshipment profit from i to j. Equation
(1) shows that total expected profit in a transshipment coalition is consisting of sum of newsvendors’
individual profits as well as the transshipment profit, i.e. RM .
Let β = {βi∣i ∈ N} be the set of individual allocations in the coalition of n newsvendors (grand
coalition). The allocation β is in the core of the transshipment game if and only if ∑i∈M βi ≥ J˙M
for all M ⊂ N , and ∑i∈N βi = J˙N (Owen, 1995). The key result of Slikker et al. (2005) ensures a
non-empty core for a transshipment game without cooperation cost of size n > 1. This implies that
it is never disadvantageous for newsvendors to form ever larger coalitions.
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2.1 Cooperative Transshipment Games with Identical Agents
Clearly, identical agents must play symmetric games. In a symmetric cooperative game, the charac-
teristic function is solely determined by the sizes of coalitions (Luce and Raiffa, 1975). For identical
newsvendors with a unit transshipment between any two newsvendors results in the same profit p,
which allows us to suppress the indices of pij . Therefore, a coalition can maximize its transshipment
profit by carrying our transshipment in the way that there will be neither any surplus or shortage
left. We have Rn(X,D) = pmin (∑ni=1Hi,∑ni=1Ei) . The expected transshipment amount is
ωn(X) = E [min( n∑
i=1Hi,
n∑
i=1Ei)] = E [min(
n∑
i=1Xi,
n∑
i=1Di) −
n∑
i=1min (Xi,Di)] . (3)
The last equation holds by min(A,B)+C = min(A+C,B +C). The vector of optimal quantities is
essentially a singleton, therefore, X is replaced by a single variable X. Furthermore, we have
E [min(X,D)] =X − ∫ X−∞ FD(ξ)dξ, (4)
E [min(nX,Z)] = nX − ∫ nX−∞ FZ(ξ)dξ (5)
where FD (fD) and FZ (fZ) are cdfs (pdfs) of the random variables D and Z = ∑ni=1Di respectively.
By substituting the terms in (1) and simplifying we obtain
Jn(X) = n(r − c)X − nt∫ X−∞ FD(ξ)dξ − p∫ nX−∞ FZ(ξ)dξ. (6)
For checking the non-emptiness of core in symmetric games, it is sufficient to check the core-
membership of equal allocations for if a non-empty core exists, then it must contain equal allocations
(Shapley and Shubik, 1967). Therefore, the core of a symmetric transshipment game is non-empty
if mβn ≥ J˙m, or βn ≥ βm, for all m ≤ n, where J˙m = maxX Jm(X) and βm = J˙m/m.
3 Expected Transshipments for Normally Distributed Demands
From now on we assume that demands at different locations are normally distributed. The main
motivation behind this assumption comes from the fact that the normal distribution is a strictly
stable distribution (Fristedt and Gray, 1997); that is, for the symmetric case, the total demand
Z = ∑ni=1Di is normally distributed with µZ = nµ and σ2Z = n (1 + (n − 1)ρ)σ2 where ρ is the
correlation efficient between every pair of random variables1. Alfaro and Corbett (2003) show that
normal distribution is a good approximation of general distribution functions in transshipment
problem. Hartman and Dror (2005), and Dong and Rudi (2004) also restrict their analysis to
normal distributions when analyzing the games among newsvendors.
Let φ and Φ be the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution respectively. Using the
transformation Y = (X − µ) /σ and letting Ln = √n/ [1 + (n − 1)ρ] we have
∫ X−∞ FD(ξ) = σ∫ Y−∞ Φ (ξ)dξ, (7)∫ nX−∞ FZ(ξ) = nσ∫ Y−∞ Φ (Lnξ)dξ. (8)
1Note that in order for the covariance matrix to be positive-semidefinite, it must be the case that −1
n−1 < ρ ≤ 1.
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Theorem 1. For Y > 0 E(∑ni=1Hi) > E(∑ni=1Ei), for Y < 0 E(∑ni=1Hi) < E(∑ni=1Ei), and for Y = 0
E(∑ni=1Hi) = E(∑ni=1Ei).
Proof. We have E(∑ni=1Hi) = nE [max(Y −D,0)] = n ∫ Y−∞ Φ(ξ)dξ , and E(∑ni=1Ei) = nE [max(D − Y,0)] =
n(−Y + ∫ Y−∞ Φ(ξ)dξ) Clearly, Y > 0 implies E(∑ni=1Hi) > E(∑ni=1Ei), Y < 0 implies E(∑ni=1Hi) <
E(∑ni=1Ei), and Y = 0 implies E(∑ni=1Hi) = E(∑ni=1Ei).
Therefore any coalition order quantity above the mean results in a positive net expected sur-
plus, and any coalition order quantity below the mean results in a positive net expected shortage.
Moreover, only the mean ensures a perfect match of expected shortage and surplus for the coalition.
Theorem 2. A coalition’s expected transshipment amount reaches its maximum at Y = 0.
Proof. By equations (3), (4), and (5) we get ωn(Y ) = nσ ∫ Y−∞ [Φ(ξ) −Φ(Lnξ)]dξ. Thus, we have
dωn(Y )
dY = nσ (Φ(Y ) −Φ (LnY )) . The function Φ is convex below zero and concave above zero. As
Ln > 0, the expected transshipment is increasing for Y < 0, decreasing for Y > 0, and reaches its
maximum at Y = 0.
4 Optimal Quantities
Our main goal now is to characterize the optimal quantities for a symmetric transshipment problem
with n newsvendors, or just a problem of size n for simplicity. Since Jn(X) in (6) is concave on X,
the optimal quantity can be found from the first order condition. Let Xn be the optimal quantity
in the problem of size n and Yn = (Xn − µ)/σ as its normal transformation. The optimal quantity
for a problem of size n is obtained through
R = γΦ(Yn) + γ˜Φ (LnYn) . (9)
where R = (r − c)/(r − ν) is the critical fractile, γ = t/(r − ν), and γ˜ = 1 − γ = p/(r − ν). We
use the modified notation to take advantage of the symmetry in the problem. The main challenge
in characterizing the optimal quantity Yn is its implicit form given in (9). The following lemma
shows the relation between optimal quantities in a problem of size n and that of single constructing
newsvendor. Due to the symmetry in the problem, we construct the proofs for only half of the
cases.
Lemma 1. For n ≥ 1, if Y1 > 0, then Yn > 0; if Y1 < 0, then Yn < 0; and if Y1 = 0, then Yn = 0.
Proof. Take the case with Y1 < 0 which is equivalent to R < 1/2. By (9) we get R = γΦ(Yn) +(1 − γ)Φ (LnYn) < 1/2. Since Yn and LnYn have the same sign, applying the monotonic increasing
function Φ results in both terms simultaneously being (a) less than, (b) greater than, or (c) equal
to 1/2. Noting 0 ≤ γ < 1, it directly follows that the cases (b) and (c) result in contradiction.
Let g = r−c and g˜ = c−ν be the benefits of selling a unit product and avoiding salvage markdown
respectively. If R < 1/2, i.e. g < g˜, then the optimal quantity for an individual newsvendor in any
problem is less than the demand mean µ, hence we refer to this type of newsvendor (problem) as an
under-mean newsvendor (problem). Similarly, if R > 1/2, i.e. g > g˜, then the optimal quantity for
an individual newsvendor in any problem is larger than the demand mean µ, hence we refer to this
type of newsvendor (problem) as an over-mean newsvendor (problem). Finally, if R = 1/2, i.e. g = g˜,
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then the optimal quantity for an individual newsvendor in any problem equals the demand mean
µ, hence we refer to this type of newsvendor (problem) as a mean newsvendor (problem). Lemma
1 then states that irrespective of transportation cost, any coalition of identical over-mean (under-
mean) newsvendors will remain over-mean (under-mean). The following theorem shows that the
over-mean problems reduce their optimal quantities, and the under-mean problems increase their
optimal quantities as their sizes grow.
Theorem 3. For over-mean problems, Y1 > Y2 > ... > Yn > ... > 0. For under-mean problems,
Y1 < Y2 < ... < Yn < ... < 0.
Proof. Take that case with Y1 < 0 and suppose that Yn−1 ≥ Yn for some n ≥ 2. The function Φ is
monotonic increasing hence we have Φ(Yn−1) ≥ Φ(Yn). By Lemma 1, Yn < 0 for all n ≥ 1, thus we
also get Ln−1Yn−1 > LnYn. Applying the Φ function will also keep the direction of inequality. Hence
we get γΦ(Yn−1) + (1 − γ)Φ (Ln−1Yn−1) > γΦ(Yn) + (1 − γ)Φ (LnYn) which violates the optimality
condition in (9). Therefore, Yn−1 < Yn for all n ≥ 2. The cases for Y1 > 0 and Y1 = 0 are proven in a
similar manner.
In conjunction with Theorem 2, Theorem 3 reveals that as the size of transshipment coalitions
grows, coalitions increase their expected transshipment amount. Although the risk pooling mecha-
nism naturally embedded in a transshipping coalition—revealed in Theorem 3—makes the mean µ
a natural target for the optimal quantity in a coalition, this optimal quantity does not necessarily
converge to the mean µ as the problem size grows. This is shown in Theorem 5 presented later in
this section. Before presenting this theorem we first get a closer look at the sequence LnYn which
is the other ingredient of implicit formula (9).
Theorem 4. For over-mean problems, 0 < Y1 < L2Y2 < ... < LnYn < .... For under-mean problems,
0 > Y1 > L2Y2 > ... > LnYn > ....
Proof. By (9), for arbitrary n we have
γ [Φ(Yn) −Φ(Yn−1)] = (1 − γ) [Φ (Ln−1Yn−1) −Φ (LnYn)] . (10)
For the case with Y1 < 0, the sequence Yn is increasing and negative (by Lemma 1 and Theorem 1).
Hence Φ(Yn)−Φ(Yn−1) < 0. In order for the equality to hold in (10), we must have Φ (Ln−1Yn−1)−
Φ (LnYn) < 0 as well. The monotone increasing property of Φ requires that LnYn > Ln−1Yn−1.
Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 show a complementary behavior of the sequences Yn and LnYn;
whenever one of them is descending the other must be ascending. This must be so in order to
satisfy the equation (9). We are now ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 5. Let Y∞ = limn→∞ Yn and L∞Y∞ = limn→∞LnYn. The following statements are true:
Game Type Cut Φ(Y∞) Φ(L∞Y∞)
Over-mean
t/2 < g˜ 1/2 1 − (g˜ − t/2) /p
t/2 ≥ g˜ 1 − g˜/t 1
Under-mean
t/2 < g 1/2 (g − t/2) /p
t/2 ≥ g g/t 0
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Proof. We need only consider the under-mean case where we have g < g˜. The sequence {Yn} is
monotonic increasing and bounded above by 0, so it converges to some finite limit. Hence {Φ(Yn)}
also is a monotonically increasing sequence bounded above by 1/2, so that 0 < Φ(Y∞) ≤ 1/2.
Thus, {Φ(LnYn)} must be a monotonically decreasing sequence bounded below by 0, so that
0 ≤ Φ(L∞Y∞) < 1/2.
There are only two possible scenarios for Φ(Y∞) and Φ(L∞Y∞): {Φ(Y∞) = 1/2 and Φ(L∞Y∞) >
0}, or {Φ(Y∞) ≤ 1/2 and Φ(L∞Y∞) = 0} (the case of {Φ(Y∞) ≤ 1/2 and Φ(L∞Y∞) > 0} is impossi-
ble).
Suppose Φ(L∞Y∞) = 0, the second case. Then from equation (9) we have R = γΦ(Y∞) ≤ 1/2
so g ≤ t/2 and t ≥ 2g. In fact, Φ(Y∞) = R/γ = g/t. Now suppose Φ(Y∞) = 1/2 for the first
case. From equation (9) we have R = γ/2 + (1 − γ)Φ(L∞Y∞) so that g = t/2 + pΦ(L∞Y∞) and
Φ(L∞Y∞) = (g − t/2)/p. But for this to be positive we must have g > t/2 so that t < 2g.
Figure 1 shows the Y∞ as a function of t for over-mean and under-mean problems.
4.1 Interpretation of the Cut Values
The cut value in Theorem 5 has an interesting interpretation. When transshipment occurs, the
cost of transport is t per unit, and equal division of the cost allocates t/2 to the sender and the
receiver.
For the under-mean case we have t/2 < g˜; thus, this share of transport cost is less than the cost
of markdown for senders, who are always better off by transshipping. Now, the incentives at the
receivers’ side depend on their share of transport cost, t/2 as well. In the case where the receiver’s
share of transport cost t/2 is less than benefit on a sale g, they are willing to do transshipment
as well. Therefore, the coalition could ideally order a quantity that results in a perfect match
of total expected shortage and surplus. This, by Theorem 1 and 2, would happen at the mean.
However, since we deal with under mean games there always is some positive net expected shortage
in the game since Yn < 0 for each n; thus, the optimal order size being equal, the mean can only
be the limit of these order sizes. In the case where the receiver’s share of transport cost t/2 is
higher than benefit on a sale g, the receivers do not see transshipment as a totally desirable option.
Therefore the conflicting incentives of senders and receivers stop the coalition order quantity at
Y∞ = Φ−1(g/t), which is short of the mean. The net shortage Sn in the under-mean game of size n
equals ∑ni=1Ei −∑ni=1Hi = ∑ni=1Di − nXn. This shortage occurs after all transshipments have been
(a) Over-mean Games (b) Under-mean Games
Figure 1: Y∞ as a function of t.
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done. This shortage needs to be equally shared by all newsvendors, and the newsvendor’s share is
Sn/n = (∑ni=1Di)/n−Xn. This share is normally distributed with mean µ−Xn = −σYn and standard
deviation σ. Therefore, P (Sn/n ≤ 0) = Φ(Yn), and the probability P (Sn ≤ 0) = Φ(Yn) that the
shortage does not occur tends to g/t as n increases for under-mean games.
For over mean games t/2 < g; thus, this share of transport cost is less than a sale for a receiver,
who is always better off by accepting transshipment. In the case where the senders’ share of
transport cost t/2 is less than markdown cost g˜, they too would rather increase the chances of
transshipment. Therefore, the coalition could ideally order a quantity that results in a perfect
match of total expected shortage and surplus. However, since we deal with over mean games there
always is some positive net expected surplus in the game since Yn > 0 for each n; thus, the optimal
order size equal to the mean can only be the limit of these order sizes. In the case that t/2 > g˜,
the share of transport cost is more than the cost of marking down for the senders. Thus, the
potential sender may prefer markdown over transshipment. Therefore the conflicting incentives of
senders and receivers stops the coalition order quantity at Y∞ = Φ−1(t − g˜)/t which is above the
mean. Therefore, the probability P (Sn > 0) = Φ(Yn) that the shortage does occur tends to g˜/t as
n increases for over-mean games.
5 Formula for Equal Core Allocations
We now derive a closed-form formula for the maximum expected profit J˙n in symmetric trans-
shipment with normally distributed demands. Start from equation (6); through standardization,
changing the integral arguments, and integration by parts we get
Jn(X) = n (g + g˜) (R(µ + σY ) − γσ [φ(Y ) + Y Φ(Y )] − γ˜σ [φ (LnY ) /Ln + Y Φ (LnY )]) (11)
For optimal order quantities, Yn, applying the optimality conditions in (9) obtains the following
closed form expression:
J˙n = n (g + g˜) (Rµ − σ [γφ(Yn) + γ˜φ (LnYn) /Ln]) . (12)
Thus the formula for equal core allocation is as follows
βn = (g + g˜) (Rµ − σ [γφ(Yn) + γ˜φ (LnYn) /Ln]) . (13)
Equation (12) and (13) do not guarantee that the J˙n and βn are always non-negative. This is due to
the fact that under normal distribution with relatively large standard deviations, negative market
demands are non-negligible (Hartman and Dror, 2005). In order to avoid this, it suffices to assume
that σ/µ ≤ g/ [(g + g˜)φ (Φ−1 (R))].
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